LEX LUTHOR AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A THEODICY
Part
2: The Philosophical Problem of Evil
It may prove
beneficial to the reader to know exactly what the term “theodicy” actually
means. It is comprised of two Greek
words, theos meaning “God” and dice meaning “justice”. A theodicy
therefore is an attempt to show that, not only does God exist, but also that He
is just, regardless of the existence of evil in the world.
While it is true that God created all
things in existence, it is not true that He created evil. Evil is not a thing
or substance but a lack in some good thing, as such God cannot be the author of
evil. Augustine argued that evil is privation, the same argument was echoed by
Aquinas. Every creation of God is good; evil exists when that good thing is
corrupted. That trees exist is a great good. Trees absorb carbon dioxide and
expel oxygen; we expel carbon dioxide while taking in oxygen. Disease, decay,
or rottenness in a tree is a lack in that good thing. Such decay exists as an
evil in that tree, the evil does not exist a
se. Some have argued, incorrectly so, that to state evil as a privation is
to claim that evil is an absence of good, but that is simply not the case. Evil
is a lacking or corruption of some good thing that should be there but is not,
as in the instance of lost sight or limbs in those things which should possess
them and do not. The fact that a stone cannot see is not evidence of evil
because it lacks that ability. By their very nature stones do not possess such
an ability, people and animals do, therefore for a person to lack the ability
to see is an evil. Explaining evil as a lack in a good thing does not explain
where the lack comes from. All it explains is the nature of evil as a real
privation in good things. Where the corruption came from is another question.[1] Philosopher Jeremy A.
Evans has said,
The concept of evil as a privation of the good has been essential in undermining at least on argument against the existence of God from evil, namely that God caused evil...God created only actual things (or substances). Evil is not an actual thing (or substance). Therefore, God did not create evil.[2]
The moral argument for God’s existence
attempts to ascertain whether objective moral values and duties actually exist. If objective moral values and duties do exist,
then God exists. If objective moral values do not exist, then God does not
exist. Objective moral values and duties do exist therefore, God does exist. If
we are going to claim that objective morality does not exist, and that morality
only exists subjectively then Hitler did nothing wrong, he was simply doing
what he believed was right. But if we know that to perform an act of genocide
on a group of people in an effort obliterate them is abhorrently wrong, then we
know that certain evils are objectively wrong and that therefore objective
morality does exist.
When we speak of value, we are speaking of the worth of some thing, this idea is
also transferable to persons as well as particular acts or behaviors. When
dealing with moral values we are
weighing certain particulars regarding whether those things, or persons, or
acts, or behaviors are good or bad. Moral duty has to do with moral
obligations, what one ought or ought not do.
A few years ago, I was speaking on Hamartiology,
or the Doctrine of Sin, when one gentleman made the comment that “in order for
us to know what good is, evil must exist”, but is that really true? Is there really no other way for us to tell
what is good unless evil is present? As I thought about it, I concluded that
the statement was false. All that would be truly necessary for Adam and Eve to
know what good was, would be for them to know the nature and character of God,
which they would have known intimately before the fall. True to his own method
of inquiry, Socrates first posed the question, “Is the good good because God
wills it? Or does God will it because it is good?” One of the world’s foremost
apologists, Dr. William Lane Craig, has put the question this way,
Is something good because God will it? Or does God will something because it is good? If you say that something is good because God wills it, then what is good becomes arbitrary. But if you say that God wills something it is good, then it what is good or bad is independent of God. IN that case, moral values and duties exist independently of God. There's a third alternative, namely, God will something because He is good.[3] (Emphasis added).
In other words, if that which is good is
only good “because God wills it”, then what is good is subjective based solely
on His own discretion, not based on any legal grounds. If this is how good is
determined, then God appears to act capriciously. But if you were to say God
wills something because the act, in and of itself, is good or bad then moral
values and duties are independent of God. But God, by His very nature, is good,
it is not possible for Him to conduct Himself in any other way, He is a law
unto Himself, for that reason “God wills something because He is good”. Adam
and Eve would have known this.
The question comes down to this, can we be
good without God? If the answer is yes, what reason could one possibly give for
being good? How would you determine what
good is in the first place? Would not all goodness become subjective? “In those days there was no king in Israel.
Everyone did what was right in his own eyes”. (Judges 21:25 ESV)[4] If we are the ones to set
the standard for that which is right and wrong then what becomes good for me
may not be good for you. "Hence today I believe that I am acting in
accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against
the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.” —Adolf Hitler (Mein Kampf).[5] Again, if that which is good is subjective
from one person to another, then Hitler was merely doing what he believed was
right and cannot therefore be faulted. For this reason, there must be an
objective standard which has been set which states that the act of murder is not
just bad, it is categorically wrong. But if there is no objectively set
standard of duty, then there is no morally binding obligation weighing on my
conscience, and yet my conscience prevails. Moral values and duties do not
exist independent of persons, that is, benevolence, mercy, justice, etcetera,
do not exist in a vacuum. Each exists as a verb, which can be active or
passive. But in order for such to exist bodies must be present for such to
bestowed upon another (active), or for one to be the recipient of (passive). Were
such properties to exist independent of persons then their effects are
non-binding and non-obligatory, yet my “conscience bearing witness” to show
mercy to those who are suffering indicates that such properties do not exist
independent of persons.
There are two aspects to the problem of
evil, the Intellectual and the Emotional. The intellectual aspect can be
further subdivided into the Logical Problem of Evil (LPE) and the Evidential
Problem of Evil (EPE). The former addresses the plausibility of the existence
of God and evil simultaneously. The latter addresses how such a God, if there
is one, could allow for the existence of such evil in the world. But what would
cause someone to question the first argument? Why would it not be possible for
God and evil to co-exist? Do they know
something about the nature of God to suggest that the existence of both God and
evil is incompatible? The argument is
often made that if God is omnipotent and omni-benevolent why does evil
remain? Thus, leading to the conclusion
that if God is powerful enough to remove it, He must be insensitive to it, or
if He is all-loving and sensitive to it, then He must not be powerful enough to
remove it. Or it may be that He just does not exist at all. But there is one
aspect of the nature of God, which is often overlooked, namely, that He is
omniscient while we are not. The adjective “omniscient” is derived from two
Latin words, Omni meaning all and scient meaning knowledge. As such, anything that can be known is known
completely by God, past, present, and future. He is infinite in knowledge,
wisdom, and understanding.
Some will argue that if God is
all-powerful, He could have created any world He wished, He could have created
a world without suffering. But are those two claims necessarily true? Is it
really true that God could have created any world He wished? As it turns out,
such a claim is actually false. While God is omnipotent, He is nevertheless
bound by certain constraints of His own nature. As He is perfect in existence,
He must therefore create that which is also perfect, He must create “the best
possible world”, to do otherwise would be contrary to His nature. As a perfect
being possessing free-will, He must likewise create creatures which are themselves
perfect, possessing free-will. The creation of free-will creatures such as we
are, is not the problem, our misuse of that freedom is. Moral evil occurs when
free persons misuse their freedom in such a way that the content of their will
and/or actions violates a moral standard.[6] As such it begs the question,
what is that standard, and where did it come from? Furthermore, in response to
the question of whether or not God could have created a world without
suffering, the answer is, He did. Then the reply invariably comes that, we
still see suffering in the world today, so no He did not. For those arguing
this point you need to go back and read part one of this article. Analytic
Philosopher Dr. Alvin Plantinga has declared,
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but he can't cause or determine them to only what is right. For if he does so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good therefore, he must create creatures capable of moral evil and he can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so.[7]
Also, God may have good reasons for
allowing suffering, some greater good may be realized as a result. Without fail
some will raise the question, “what possible good could come from allowing
people to suffer”? But we actually do
this all the time, when we take our children to the dentist, or to the doctor
to get a shot, there is a measure of suffering and fear, but good will come of
it. This brings us to the Evidential Problem of Evil (EPE) and the atheistic
argument that it is improbable that God could have good reasons for permitting
suffering. In “the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access” or “theistic
skepticism” is the notion that if there were some greater good that may be
realized from God’s permittance of the existence of evil in the world, our
cognitive limitations simply do not allow for us to know or comprehend fully His
reasons for doing so. Philosopher Dr. William
Alston has stated,
each theodicy provided as a response to evil reveals 'limits to our cognitive powers, opportunities, and achievements in arguing that we are not in the right position to deny that God nave the kind of reason [some greater food] for various cases of suffering.'[8]
For the atheist, to make the claim that no
greater good could come from the allowance of evil and suffering is ignorant.
As persons we are finite, contingent beings, limited by space, time, intellect,
and insight. God is an infinite, necessary being, omniscient in existence. “I
am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning and
from ancient times things not yet done, saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, and I
will accomplish all my purpose,’” (Is.46:9b-10). Due to our own limitations as
finite creatures we are, quite simply, in no way able to make so great a
judgement on whether or not God could have good reasons for the permittance of
suffering. Dr. Stephen Wykstra has argued that,
the gap between our intellect and God's is enormous. If there is any charity to be ascribed to a situation, it must be, of necessity, to the God whose intellectual powers have no rival. Thus, 'if we think carefully about the sort of being theism proposes for our belief, it is entirely expectable - given what we know of our cognitive limits - that the goods by virtue of which this Being allows known suffering should very often be beyond our ken.'[9]
Does the atheist believe the existence of
God is impossible or merely improbable or unlikely? And if so, improbable
relative to what? What great enlightenment, what vast knowledge acquired, to
lead one to such a conclusion? How many times have I come across this? The
existence of evil and suffering in the world is often employed by atheists as a
rescuing device when the argument starts to go sideways because the evidence
for the existence of God is actually quite extensive. As such, they begin to
realize that His existence is not impossible and therefore unlikely due to the
degree of evil and suffering in the world. Craig has stated,
"I'm convinced that whatever improbability suffering may cast upon God's existence, it's outweighed by the arguments for the existence of God."[10]
Furthermore, if we are going to be entirely
honest, much of the suffering that people do experience is the result of poor
choices or decisions they make themselves. Or, as the result of evil acts of
individuals, or groups, perpetrated on another. Should someone move to a region
prone to flooding and mudslides and a family home is destroyed, or people have
died as a result, God cannot be faulted. If someone should live in a region prone
to earthquakes and annual forest fires during the summer months, such as in
California, again God cannot be faulted when these things occur. If someone
should reside in a region prone to drought and their crops fail, God cannot be
held responsible. Should someone reside in the region of “tornado alley” and
their home is destroyed by one, you cannot blame God for that. In each of those
cases, people choose to live in those regions despite the possible risks. I do
not like the cold and snow, but my wife and I chose to have our home built in a
region characterized as the “snowbelt”. So, during the winter months we receive
more snow in our region than the average, but that was our choice to build
there. These are examples of what is referred to as natural evil.
What about when people contract an
illness? Certainly, some of the illnesses that people experience is again the
result of choices we have made. Poor diet can lead to heart disease as well as
certain cancers. Substance abuse like alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, legal or
illegal can result in serious illness and/or death. Use of alcohol and/or
tobacco can also lead to various forms of cancer. This type of evil is referred
to as physical evil. Though some have encompassed physical evil with
natural evil as being one and the same. Regardless, there is another aspect to this
whole issue that runs at a deeper level. Making sense of these deep and often
emotional experiences, this I will address in part three.
[1] Geisler, Norman L.. If God, Why Evil?: A New Way to Think About the
Question (p. 26). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
[2] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential
Christian Beliefs (B&H Studies in Christian Apologetics) (p. 1). B&H
Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
[3] Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and
Precision (Kindle Locations 2207-2208). David C. Cook. Kindle Edition
[4] Unless otherwise indicated, all scriptural quotes are from The Holy
Bible. English Standard Version, with Strong’s Numbers (Wheaton IL: Crossway,
2008).
[6] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential
Christian Beliefs (B&H Studies in Christian Apologetics) (p. 2). B&H
Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
[7] Ibid., 18. Quoting Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 30.
[8] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential
Christian Beliefs (B&h Studies in Christian Apologetics) (pp. 28-29).
B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. Quoting Alston, “Inductive Argument
from Evil,” 59.
[9] Ibid., (p. 30). Quoting Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to
Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of Appearance,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 91.
[10] Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and
Precision (Kindle Locations 2639-2642). David C. Cook. Kindle Edition.
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