In the movie, Batman V. Superman Lex Luthor
put forward an explicit argument on the character of God,
“What we call God, depends upon our tribe…Because God is tribal, God
takes sides. No man in the sky intervened when I was a boy to deliver me from
daddy’s fist and abominations. I figured out way back, if God is all-powerful
then He cannot be all-good, and if He is all-good, then He cannot be
all-powerful.” Lex Luthor – Batman v. Superman
This type of argument against the
existence of God is commonly referred to as the problem of evil. It is not a
new problem; it actually has a rather lengthy history. Typically, Epicurus
(341-270 B.C.) has been credited with formulating what has been referred to as
the Epicurean Paradox, but it was Scottish Philosopher David Hume who
popularized it. His version of the argument is stated in the following way,
"Is he [God] willing to prevent evil,
but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"
The first question I would ask is, how did
Lex Luthor know that his father’s actions against him were evil? Why does he
come to that conclusion? Could it be that Lex Luther has an innate sense of
what is right or wrong? That certain evils perpetrated are not arbitrary or
subjective, but that objective morality does in fact exist? That certain acts
of evil exist regardless of time, location, occasion, or circumstance?
If objective moral values exist, then God
exists. If objective moral values do not exist, then God does not exist.
Objective moral values do exist therefore, God does exist. If we are going to
claim that objective morality does not exist, and that morality only exists
subjectively then Hitler did nothing wrong, he was simply doing what he
believed was right. Ergo, Luther’s father did nothing wrong in beating him as a
child. But if we know that to perform an act of genocide on a group of people
in an effort to obliterate them, or to beat and sexually abuse a child is
abhorrently wrong, then we know that certain evils are objectively wrong and
that therefore objective morality does exist.
God is perfect in existence in the
absolute, as such, He can do nothing which is contrary to His own nature. God
is light, and in him is no darkness at all (1 Jn. 1:5). While God is
omnipotent, there are some things that He cannot do, He cannot sin, He cannot
be tempted, He cannot deny (contradict) Himself, He cannot lie, for God cannot
be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one (James 1:13b). He may test
an individual, but He will not tempt anyone. Evil acts are the out workings of
a sinful nature. Evil is extraneous, sin is constitutional, evil is an effect
and sin is its efficient cause. This article will come in two parts, in the
first part I will address the doctrine of sin, in the second part I will
address the more philosophical problem of evil.
Part One: The Doctrine of Sin
The philosophical problem of evil is
predicated on the theological doctrine of sin or hamartiology, derived from the
Greek word, hamartia, meaning, “to miss the mark”. In theological
circles it is referred to as the doctrine of “original sin”. Original sin is a
term referring to the universal defect in human nature caused by the fall,
entailing the loss of original righteousness and the distortion of the image of
God (imago Dei) [i] in man.
1.
Man in the Image of God
The world as it is, “red in tooth and
claw”, is not the way God originally created it when He pronounced it “very
good”. In the Genesis account of creation, the Hebrew adjective, ṭôḇ is translated as “good” six
times. This Hebrew word has been translated a number of different ways, “good”
is one way, but also as “appropriate” and “excellent”. He certainly would not
create anything that was not excellent, or which was inappropriate, even if He
could do it He would not do it as it would be contrary to His nature to do so.
In Genesis 1:31 the writer uses a double
adjective to express the state of God’s completed creation, “very good”. All
that God had made was not just “good” it was “very good”, me‘ôḏ meaning vehemently, exceedingly, or exceedingly great to a
high degree. Everything that God had
created was not only excellent (or ṭôḇ)
it was exceedingly excellent (me‘ôḏ
ṭôḇ) , or great, to a high degree. The creation of man would have been
no less excellent.
Then God said, “Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea
and over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth
and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.” (Gen. 1:26).
Differences of opinion respecting the
likeness of man to God early appeared in Christian thought. With a common
agreement that man himself was the image of God, there was still the cardinal
question as to what really constituted man. Some could not dispense with the
body as an essential part, and therefore assumed for it a likeness to God. This
required the assumption of some form of corporeity in God; for it is not to be
thought that a physical nature can bear the likeness of a purely spiritual
being. [ii]
This idea that man’s “likeness” to God or
having been “created in the image of God”, inferred some corporeal similitude
with God never gained widespread acceptance. Rather, the predominant view was
that being “created in the image of God” meant that he was like God in his
spiritual nature, not in his physical make up. Contrary to some New Age
thinkers who believe that we are God.
There seems to have been some rather
divisive discussion over the years regarding the question of the words, “image”
and “likeness” and their respective meaning. Whether their meaning is
different, or if the two words serve jointly to express a singular notion. Some
church fathers including Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen believed
that these two words possessed distinctive meanings. Such a view is utterly
discredited by the fact that this likeness of man to God was an original
creation, not any subsequent attainment through either the free agency of man
or the sovereignty of divine grace. A distinction of meanings in the two
original terms is again discredited by the fact that in other places only one
is used, sometimes one and sometimes the other, and in a manner to give to each
the full meaning of both in the primary instance of their conjunct use. [iii]
The words “image” and “likeness” are
derived from two Hebrew words, ṣelem;
LXX εἰκών; Lat. imago) and “likeness” (Heb. d’mûth;
LXX ὁμοίωσις; Lat. similitudo).[iv] Selem or image is utilized seventeen times
in the Old Testament, four of those occurrences are found in Genesis. The four
times the word is used in Genesis occurs as part of the phrase, “image of God”.
Of the thirteen times the word is used outside the book of Genesis, six are in
reference to idols, three refer to the “physical representation” of tumors and
rats, two are in reference to something transitory, one is in reference to a
painting, and the last is in reference to Seth being in the image of Adam. The
Hebrew for image (selem) comes from a root word meaning “to cut” or “hew”, so
typically the reference is in the physical sense, though selem can refer to
things which are intangible which is not unreasonable as the definition implies
such things as man’s ability to contemplate the meaning of life and his own
mortality. The ability to conduct himself rationally, or irrationally. To
conduct himself morally or to contemplate the consequences of his immorality,
the ability to reason or act volitionally and so on.
The “likeness” of man to God was
constituted in the fact that God is a spirit (Jn. 4:24), while physical in
makeup man is also a spiritual being and is therefore relatable to God on that
level. Furthermore, man is moral in nature, possessing a sense of duty and
obligation, right and wrong, as previously noted, which tends toward the moral
argument for God’s existence. There is within man’s being created in the image
of God, the sense of implicit holiness as born out in the life of the
regenerate, a recreation of fallen man back to the image of God once again,
whose image though defaced by sin was not erased by it. Jonathan Edwards has
stated that,
“Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a
moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under a rule of right action; he
was obliged as soon as he existed to act right. And if he was obliged to act
right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be inclined to act
right.… And as he was obliged to act right from the first moment of his
existence, and did do so till he sinned in the affair of the forbidden fruit,
he must have had an inclination or disposition of heart to do right the first
moment of his existence; and that is the same as to be created or brought into
existence, with an inclination, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and
holy disposition of heart.” [v]
Theologian John Miley appears to contest
Edwards’ view that Adam was “obliged” to “act right” when no act of duty was
yet pending on his person. Perhaps, but Adam was created in the image of God,
implicit within that creation was a holy disposition on the part of Adam who,
therefore, would at least have been “inclined to act right” though not, as yet,
having the occasion to do so. Though doubtful of Edwards view Miley recognizes
that, “There may be holiness of the moral nature previous to free moral action…Whatever
it might become by good conduct, such it might be constituted in its original
creation”. [vi] Furthermore, Miley recognized that a moral nature must have
moral tendencies. [vii]
2.
The Origin of Sin
Biblical history is divided by
dispensations, the “dispensation of innocence” is the time frame of the
creation of man which extends to the time of the fall of the same (Genesis
1-3). Biblical history may also be divided by covenants; this same time frame,
under covenant theology, has been referred to as “the covenant of works”,
though some have argued that there is no explicit evidence from the text that
any such covenant existed as the Hebrew word for covenant, ḇerîyṯ (ber-eeth'),
can be located nowhere in the text of the creation account. That being said, many will concede, at least,
a probationary period is very possible, but not necessarily as a covenant per
se.
There is no injustice here on the part of
God in implementing a period of testing, human depravity is a consequence of
man’s sin. What would constitute an injustice would be if God had instituted a
probationary period for man without man’s having the ability to perform it in
the way he ought to as a moral duty. As Geisler has noted, “there can be no
response-ability without the ability to respond.” [viii]
If God had so desired that man should be
obedient, happy, and to conduct himself after a holy manner, then He must have
endowed him with such power and ability so as to perform it. Therefore, they
must have possessed the power of obedience as a divine endowment. There can be
no testing of fidelity under a law of duty where there is not the power of
obedience. [ix]
Theologian Henry Orton Wiley held that
this probation period was necessary and that as such God permitted their
temptation. While I agree with the former, I would contest the latter. What God
was willing to permit was a period of testing which, as a result, could lead to
one’s being tempted. But being tempted is not the problem submitting to it is,
which was a possibility given that they were created as free creatures.
Nevertheless, they still possessed within themselves “the power of obedience”.
Likewise, Miley contended that God permitted “the Adamic fall”. This, as in the
former is, I believe, contestable on the same grounds as I have made regarding
Wiley’s position. God was not permitting their temptation or the fall of the
race, as Miley has indicated, obedience to His instruction was preferable. What
God did permit was their testing; probation is a temporal, testing economy.
There is a law of duty, with the sanction of rewards. The essential fact of probation under a
testing law of duty is moral responsibility. [x]
God is free, being free He is able to
choose whether to create or not to create. As He has chosen to create, He must
therefore create that which is perfect, He must create the “best possible
world”, it would be contrary to His nature to do otherwise. A perfect being,
such as He is, must create that which is perfect, therefore Adam and Eve were
created as perfect. How can a perfect Adam or a perfect Eve be capable of
committing an act of sin? As God is free, a perfect world must include in it
creatures which are themselves free. Possessing free-will and the ability to
choose means, however, the ability to choose otherwise, or to choose contrary
to God’s will. We are moral creatures possessing free-will and a sense of duty,
as such a period of testing is necessary. A being personally constituted and
endowed with free moral agency must be under law to God, and responsible for
his conduct. [xi]
The nature of free-will could either be
deterministic, in-deterministic, or self-deterministic. Determinism can come in
two forms, soft or hard determinism. Soft determinism holds that human
free-will is under God’s control. In hard determinism there is no free-will.
Indeterminism takes the neutral position that human acts are not caused by
anything. Self-determinism holds that free-will acts are self-caused. As for
determinism, God did not cause Adam to sin, for, again, God can neither sin nor
tempt anyone else to do so. Neither did Satan cause Adam to sin, for the
tempter did only what his name implies, neither forcing him to do it nor doing
it for him. As for indeterminism, there was not evil (or lack of wholeness) in
Adam’s nature that gave rise to his sin, for he had none – God created him
perfect. And there are no uncaused actions; this would violate the principle of
causality. [xii] Geisler has stated that,
“Adam… must have caused it himself; Adam’s choice was self-determined.
This is the heart of human freedom; namely, the ability to be the efficient
cause of one’s own moral actions. Acts of which one is not the efficient cause,
but rather which are forced, are not free moral acts.” [xiii]
When Adam partakes of the fruit in Genesis 3, the most severe charge
brought against God is not that he caused Adam to sin, but that in making Adam
significantly free God brought about the possibility that Adam might
misappropriate his freedom and choose a course of action that is morally wrong.
God is not responsible for Adam’s choices given that Adam was endowed in
creation with self-determining free will. [xiv]
The object of their testing lay in the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil and God’s express instruction not to eat
of it, therefore a choice for creatures of free-will, either to obey the word
of God or to follow the lie of the serpent existed. Obedience would have
resulted in reward, by extension disobedience would have resulted in
punishment. In terms of the punitive punishments of sin, physical, spiritual,
and possible eternal death ensued. In addition, human depravity is the result
of a deprivation. When man sinned, he lost the moral image of God in which he
had been created. This meant that the Holy Ghost withdrew from his being, and
man lost his state of primitive holiness. The result of this deprivation or
loss was that the tide of sin flowed in upon man, overflowing his whole nature.
The controlling, enabling, sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit being lost, man
became estranged from God, enslaved to irregular impulses and evil passions. [xv]
Man’s whole nature was affected as a
result of sin. Having the freedom to choose is a good thing, however, it is
possible that such freedom could be misused. God is responsible for the
creation of free-will creatures such as we are. Man is responsible for the
misuse of that freedom. “For from within, out of the heart of man, come evil
thoughts, sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, coveting, wickedness,
deceit, sensuality, envy, slander, pride, foolishness”. (Mark 7:21-22).
The total depravity of our human nature
has resulted from Adam’s acting as federal head of the entire race. Such
depravity was imputed, though the race did not exist at the time of Adam’s
transgressing, yet existing in him potentially, we all receive the curse and
stand guilty. Such total depravity intimates inability to achieve by our own
striving any form of absolution from such guilt. Our depravity, reprehensible
as it is, does not indicate an inability to receive from God that which He
graciously offers, forgiveness.
So, what does all this have to do with
Alexander (Lex) Luthor? We are not sinners because we sin, we sin because we
are sinners. To claim the former would indicate that all are innocent up to and
until a transgression is actualized, but this runs contrary to scripture.
Scripture actually purports the latter, that we sin because we are sinners by
nature. The reason Luthor, his father, and we ourselves, do what we do merely
shows that we are sinners already. God cannot be implicated; we act in
accordance with our own free-will to do right or not. We commit acts of sin by
commission, doing what we know we ought not do, and sins of omission, not doing
those things we know we should do. The apostle Paul not only recognized the
problem in himself, but also its solution. Romans 7:15-25.
This article has been built around two
premises, (1) that God is wholly perfect in existence and existing as a perfect
being with total freedom it is impossible that He should create anything
imperfect. That man being created in the image and likeness of God was perfect
in existence possessing a holy disposition, and was created as a free moral
agent, with the ability and freedom to choose. (2) That Adam acting as federal
head of the race did of his own volition enact his own will contrary to the
will of God bringing sin into the world and death as its consequent. Thus,
leading to the conclusion that God cannot be held to account for sin’s origin
and the suffering that has resulted from it.
[i] Hay, A. (2016). Original Sin. In J. D.
Barry, D. Bomar, D. R. Brown, R. Klippenstein, D. Mangum, C. Sinclair Wolcott,
… W. Widder (Eds.), The Lexham Bible Dictionary. Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press.
[ii] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume
1 (p. 406). New York: Hunt & Eaton.
[iii] Ibid., 406–7
[iv] Ryle, H. E. (1921). The Book of
Genesis in the Revised Version with Introduction and Notes (p. 20). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[v] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology,
Volume 1 (p. 411). Quoting Edwards: Works, vol. ii, p. 385. New York: Hunt
& Eaton.
[vi] Ibid., 412.
[vii] Ibid., 434.
[viii] Geisler, Norman. (2004). Systematic
Theology: Vol. 3 (p. 86). Bloomington, MI: Bethany House Publishers.
[ix] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology,
Volume 1 (pp. 433–434). New York: Hunt & Eaton.
[x] Ibid., 437.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Geisler, Norman. Systematic Theology:
Vol. 3 (Bloomington, MI: Bethany House Publishers, 2004), p. 86.
[xiii] Ibid.
[xiv] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The
Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs (B&h Studies in Christian
Apologetics) (p. 9). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition
[xv] Wiley, H. Orton. (1946). Introduction
to Christian Theology, (p. 177). Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press.
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